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385 
COURTS AS GATEKEEPERS: THE CASE FOR MINIMAL 
DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 
Brent Droze* 
Abstract: In Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit encountered an important, yet 
unresolved, question: how much deference should a court give an agency for its interpretation 
of a common-law term used in a statute or regulation? Traditionally, the Chevron and Auer 
deference doctrines provide agencies significant freedom in clarifying and interpreting statutes 
and regulations. The use of these doctrines, though, becomes problematic when applied to fact 
patterns where agencies interpret the meaning of common-law terms. This Comment argues 
that courts should not apply either Chevron or Auer deference doctrines in cases where an 
agency interprets a term that already has a well-settled meaning in common law. Chevron 
deference is inappropriate in this scenario because Chevron is only applicable when a statute 
is ambiguous. By choosing to use a common-law term in a statute, Congress removed any 
possible ambiguity as to the meaning of the term. Congress intends for common-law terms in 
statutes to align with their common-law definitions. Auer deference is also inappropriate in 
this scenario. An agency cannot use a common-law term in a regulation, subsequently interpret 
that term to mean something other than its well-established definition in the common law, and 
then receive judicial deference for that interpretation. Courts, not agencies, are the appropriate 
arbiters of the meaning of a common-law term. This Comment argues that Skidmore deference 
is the most appropriate standard of review for agency interpretations of common-law terms. 
Skidmore appropriately balances an agency’s right to interpret statutes and regulations and the 
judiciary’s responsibility to create, maintain, and uphold the common law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine Jack and his partner want to travel from Seattle, Washington 
to Walla Walla, Washington for a quick, three-day weekend wine-tasting 
getaway. They can make the trip by car, but spending nine hours round-
trip travelling during a short weekend does not seem appealing. Jack looks 
at airline tickets, but spending several hundred dollars and dealing with 
the hassle of airport parking, check-in, and baggage collection does not 
sound like fun either. Jack wishes that there was an easier way; he wishes 
that they could just ride along with a private pilot leaving Seattle and 
headed to Walla Walla this weekend. After all, if he can hail a taxi to the 
airport using Uber, and find a place to stay in Walla Walla using AirBnB, 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to give a 
special thanks to Professor Kathryn Watts for her incisive guidance and edits—without her help this 
would not be possible. I would also like to thank my friends and peers at Washington Law Review for 
their thoughtful critiques, suggestions, and editing. 
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why is Jack’s desire to use the “sharing economy” to book a flight for their 
weekend getaway unreasonable? 
The short answer is, before the D.C. Circuit’s Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA1 
opinion, Jack could use the “sharing economy” to reserve and share flights 
with private pilots. In Flytenow, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) determination that Flytenow, an internet-
based flight-sharing service, violated FAA regulations because it 
permitted private pilots to advertise their itineraries to website members.2 
The FAA determined, and the court agreed, that private pilots that used 
Flytenow were “common carriers” that did not have the proper 
credentialing to conduct flights with paying passengers.3 The FAA’s 
definition of the common-law term “common carriage,” and the D.C. 
Circuit’s deference to the FAA’s definition, played a vital role in the 
FAA’s determination that Flytenow’s business model was impermissible.4 
Federal agencies like the FAA are given significant latitude to 
promulgate regulations and define ambiguous terms in order to implement 
and execute federal statutory regimes.5 Title 49 of the United States Code 
charges the administrator of the FAA with maintaining safety of air 
commerce within the United States.6 It provides the administrator with the 
power to promulgate rules, orders, and circulars to carry out the FAA’s 
regulatory functions.7 Flying is an inherently dangerous activity, and 
ensuring the safety of the flying public is inherent in the wide grant of 
power delegated to the FAA by Congress.8 Between 1990 and 2003, 
general aviation (non-commercial aviation) accounted for eighty-two 
percent of flying accidents and eighty-three percent of aircraft fatalities in 
the United States.9 Between 1983 and 1996, the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) assigned pilot error as the cause of eighty-five 
percent of general aviation crashes.10 These bleak statistics for general 
aviation, coupled with the fact that the average general aviation pilot flies 
                                                     
1. 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 618 (2017). 
2. Id. at 885. 
3. Id. at 892. 
4. Id. at 889–90. 
5. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
6. 49 U.S.C. § 40104(a) (2012). 
7. Id. § 106(f)(2)(A)(iii). 
8. Laurence E. Gesell & Robert Anderson, Compliance and Enforcement: Aviation Safety in the 
Public Interest, 2 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RES. 13, 13 (1991). 
9. Massoud Bazargan & Vitaly S. Guzhva, Impact of Gender, Age and Experience of Pilots on 
General Aviation Accidents, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 962, 962 (2011). 
10. Gouhua Li, Susan P. Baker & Jurek G. Grabowski, Factors Associated with Pilot Error in 
Aviation Crashes, 72 AVIATION, SPACE, & ENVTL. MED. 52, 53 (2001). 
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fewer than 100 hours in a year,11 could lead a reasonable observer to agree 
with the FAA’s position that Flytenow’s pilots must have more than 
private pilot licenses to transport paying passengers. 
The D.C. Circuit based its decision in Flytenow on the reasonableness 
of the FAA’s determination—that is, the reasonableness of its definition 
of the common-law term “common carriage.”12 This Comment argues that 
the D.C. Circuit, while ultimately reaching the correct decision, missed an 
important opportunity to authoritatively speak to the proper level of 
deference that courts should extend to agency interpretations of common-
law terms. Many scholars and judges have written about the various 
deference doctrines, but none clearly discuss the issue of when the 
common law is a part of an agency’s regulatory decision-making process. 
This Comment is not solely about whether the FAA reasonably and 
correctly disallowed Flytenow’s business. Instead, it uses Flytenow to 
analyze the decision-making process courts use when determining the 
correct level of deference to agency interpretations of common-law terms. 
This Comment argues that when agencies interpret the meaning of 
common-law terms (for example, when the FAA interpreted the meaning 
of “common carrier” in Flytenow), courts should, as a rule, only afford 
those interpretations a minimal level of judicial deference. 
Part I of this Comment contains a broad overview of Flytenow’s 
business, the statutory and regulatory landscape of the aviation industry, 
and the Flytenow case. Part II provides background on the use of common-
law terms in statutes and regulations and how courts address issues 
regarding the meaning of those common-law terms in litigation. Part III 
argues that courts should not give agencies Chevron13 or Auer14 deference 
for their interpretations of common-law terms, but should instead conduct 
a review of the agency’s interpretation, compare the agency interpretation 
of the term with the well-settled, judicially approved definition of the 
                                                     
11. Matthew L. Wald, To Pick a Private Pilot, Check Hours Logged in a Plane, Recent Flying and 
Personality, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/25/us/pick-private-pilot-
check-hours-logged-plane-recent-flying-personality.html [http://perma.cc/JKT4-ZP9C]. 
12. Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 
618 (2017) (noting that, without resorting to “the familiar Auer v. Robbins framework . . . . we have 
no difficulty upholding the FAA’s interpretation of its regulations in this case”). 
13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
14. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
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term, and give the agency deference only to the extent that the agency 
definition matches the common-law meaning of the term. 
I. THE FLYTENOW STORY 
Part I of this Comment provides the basic background information 
needed to understand Flytenow and how it fits into the jurisprudence of 
judicial deference to federal agencies. First, this Part explains the reasons 
behind Flytenow’s inception and development, and provides a basic 
overview of its services. Second, this Part provides an overview of the 
federal aviation statutes and regulations at play in Flytenow. Finally, this 
Part analyzes Flytenow, explaining the events that led to the litigation, the 
arguments for and against deference to agencies for their interpretations 
of common-law terms, and the D.C. Circuit’s final disposition of the issue. 
A. Flytenow Background Facts 
Flytenow was a web-based flight-sharing service that coordinated 
connections between pilots and “general aviation enthusiasts” who paid a 
share of the flight’s expenses in exchange for the ability to ride along on 
a route predetermined by the pilot.15 In its heyday, Flytenow claimed 
about 25,000 members, including casual travelers and several thousand 
private and commercial pilots.16 Alan Guichard, an attorney, and Matt 
Voska, a private pilot,17 founded Flytenow in 2014.18 The pair started the 
website and service in an attempt to make general aviation flying more 
budget-friendly.19 Despite comparisons to car ridesharing services like 
Uber and Lyft, Guichard and Voska preferred to characterize Flytenow as 
“carpooling for aviation” instead of an “Uber of the skies.”20 Similar to 
                                                     
15. Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 885. 
16. Dan Weikel, Flytenow, the Aviation Version of Uber and Lyft, Is Locked in Court Battle with 
Regulators, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-california-
commute-20151027-story.html [https://perma.cc/3GL8-PU6G]. 
17. Id. 
18. Casey C. Sullivan, ‘Uber of the Skies’ Grounded After D.C. Cir. Ruling, FINDLAW (Jan. 5, 
2016), http://blogs.findlaw.com/dc_circuit/2016/01/uber-of-the-skies-grounded-after-dc-cir-ruling. 
html [https://perma.cc/KD6M-85UG]. 
19. Sarah Buhr, So I Flew in an “Uber for Tiny Planes,” TECHCRUNCH (June 20, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/ 2014/06/20/ uber-for-x-in-a-tiny-plane/ [https://perma.cc/4W9B-3TYT]. 
20. Jared Meyer, Uber for Planes?, FORBES (May 31, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jaredmeyer/2016/05/31/uber-for-planes/#3a03569b383f [https://perma.cc/2KAS-XQRF]. 
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European-based flight-sharing service Wingly,21 and now-defunct 
American-based flight-sharing service AirPooler,22 Flytenow was a web-
based bulletin board where private pilots posted their flight plans to see if 
anyone was interested in sharing a flight to the pilot’s destination.23 The 
website allowed “a pilot to unilaterally post a planned flight, if . . . [the 
posting contained] (1) the specific date and time, (2) the points of 
operation, and (3) the purpose of the flight.”24 Flytenow’s website 
prohibited passengers from requesting a specific destination,25 but if a 
passenger found a suitable flight itinerary and a pilot accepted the 
passenger’s request to ride along,26 the website matched the parties and 
the passenger and pilot would fly to the destination. After completing the 
flight, the pilot calculated the actual operating expenses of the flight to 
receive reimbursement from Flytenow for the passenger’s share of the 
flight’s operating costs.27 Flytenow monetized its role as a facilitator by 
collecting a ten-dollar surcharge from the passenger.28 
On February 12, 2014, Flytenow submitted a request to the FAA for a 
legal opinion of the company’s compliance with FAA regulations and 
directives.29 Specifically, Flytenow requested a legal interpretation of the 
validity of its services with relation to the FAA’s existing rules concerning 
common carriage.30 The FAA responded on August 14, 2014, referring 
Flytenow to an Interpretative Letter sent to AirPooler31 that discussed 
                                                     
21. Andrew Meleta & Jared Meyer, Uber in the Air, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438735/faa-bans-non-commercial-aviation-wrongly-
flytenow-goes-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/4LX2-4BF2]. 
22. Alan Levin & Thomas Black, FAA Ruling Grounds AirPooler’s Uber-Style Sharing in Air 
Travel, INS. J. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/08/15/ 
337657.htm [https://perma.cc/PN3L-LERL]. 
23. Weikel, supra note 16. 
24. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-01168). 
25. Id.  
26. Id. (“Flytenow allows pilots to accept or reject such member’s request to join the planned flight, 
for any or no reason, and at any time.”). 
27. Id. 
28. Lauren Gardner, Uber, but for Planes, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2015, 7:48 AM), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2015/08/the-faa-vs-uber-for-planes-121620 [https://perma.cc/27BR-4T73]. 
29. Alan Guichard, The Legality of Ridesharing in Aviation, FLYTENOW BLOG (July 11, 2014, 8:11 
AM), http://blog.flytenow.com/the-legality-of-ride-sharing-in-aviation [https://perma.cc/SAU9-RH 
AL]. 
30. Letter from Gregory S. Winton to Mark. W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel, Fed. Aviation 
Admin. (Feb. 12, 2014) (J.A. at 49, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-01168)) [hereinafter Winton 
letter]; see also infra section I.B.2.iv for a discussion of the term “common carriage.” 
31. See Legal Interpretation to Gregory S. Winton from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel, 
Fed. Aviation Admin. (Aug. 14, 2014) (J.A. at 61–62, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-01168)) 
[hereinafter Winton Interpretation]. 
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several of the same issues raised by Flytenow.32 In that letter, the FAA 
concluded that ridesharing services like Flytenow and AirPooler required 
a Part 119 certificate33 because they were engaged in common carriage.34 
To support its finding that pilots utilizing Flytenow and AirPooler were 
engaged in common carriage, the FAA referenced FAA Advisory Circular 
120-12A,35 which defined “common carriage” as “(1) a holding out of a 
willingness to (2) transport persons or property (3) from place to place (4) 
for compensation or hire.”36 The FAA went on to say that “[h]olding out 
can be accomplished by any ‘means which communicates to the public 
that a transportation service is indiscriminately available’ to the members 
of that segment of the public it is designed to attract.”37 Essentially, the 
FAA determined that any pilots using the Flytenow website held 
themselves out to the public as willing to transport persons from place to 
place for compensation.38 This made the pilots “common carriers” subject 
to 14 C.F.R. Part 119.39 
B. Relevant Regulations and Statutes in Flytenow 
Before embarking on a detailed review of the arguments presented by 
both parties, this section provides a basic understanding of the applicable 
statutes and agency regulations at play in Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA. 
1. Statutory Framework for the Decision in Flytenow 
The Federal Aviation Act of 195840 provides for the “safe and efficient” 
use of the national airspace by both general and commercial aviation 
aircraft.41 The purpose of the Act is to “regulat[e]and promot[e] . . . civil 
                                                     
32. See Legal Interpretation to Rebecca B. MacPherson from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief 
Counsel, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Aug. 13, 2014) (J.A. at 57–60, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-
01168)) [hereinafter MacPherson Interpretation]. 
33. See infra section I.B.2.iii. for a deeper discussion of 14 C.F.R. Part 119. 
34. See MacPherson Interpretation, supra note 32, at J.A. 60. 
35. See FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A (Private Carriage Versus Common Carriage of Persons 
or Property) (J.A. at 30–32, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-01168)) [hereinafter Advisory Circular]. 
36. See Winton Interpretation, supra note 31, at J.A. 62. 
37. Id. (quoting Transocean Airlines, Enforcement Proceeding, 11 C.A.B. 350 (1950)). 
38. Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA 808 F.3d 882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 
618 (2017). 
39. Id.  
40. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. 
41. Federal Aviation Agency Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce United States Senate on S. 3880, 85th Cong. 1 (1958) (statement 
of Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney, Chairman, S. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). 
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aviation . . . [and to] foster its development and safety.”42 The Federal 
Aviation Act created the Federal Aviation Agency43 and gave the new 
agency the power to make and enforce air safety rules.44 The Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 is currently codified in Subtitle VII of Title 49 of 
the United States Code.45 
Title 49 makes the Administrator of the FAA responsible for ensuring 
the safety of air commerce within the United States.46 It also empowers 
the Administrator to promulgate regulations necessary for the safety of air 
transportation.47 The statutory definition of interstate air transportation 
found in Title 49 is important for understanding the arguments set forth in 
this Comment. “Interstate air transportation” is defined as “the 
transportation of passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier 
for compensation.”48 Notably, neither the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
nor its codified version within Subtitle VII of Title 49, define the 
common-law term “common carrier.”49 The lack of a definition for the 
common-law term “common carrier” is central to the dispute in 
Flytenow.50 With no statutory definition provided for the term “common 
carrier,” the FAA promulgated its own definition of the term “common 
carrier” in a subsequent regulation.51 The definition promulgated by the 
FAA is the same definition the D.C. Circuit grappled with, and ultimately 
agreed with, when it decided Flytenow.52 
2. Regulatory Framework for the Decision in Flytenow 
FAA regulations, and the agency’s guidance interpreting those 
regulations, played an important role in the court’s decision in Flytenow. 
Title 14, Chapter 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations houses the 
                                                     
42. Id. 
43. The Federal Aviation Agency was renamed the Federal Aviation Administration in the 
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89f670, § 3(e)(i), 80 Stat. 931, 932. 
44. See supra note 41, at 2. 
45. Jol A. Silversmith, “It, Being Dead, Yet Speaketh”: The Recodification of the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958, 29 AIR & SPACE LAWYER 8, 8 (2016). 
46. 49 U.S.C. § 40104(a) (2012). 
47. Id. § 44701(a)(5). 
48. Id. § 40102(a)(25) (emphasis added) (the common-law term, “common carrier,” is the term at 
issue in Flytenow). 
49. See id. § 40102 (2015); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. 
50. Infra section I.D. 
51. Infra section I.B.2.iv. 
52. Infra section I.D.3. 
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regulations promulgated by the FAA.53 This section highlights important 
elements of the regulatory framework necessary to understand the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Flytenow. 
i. Regulatory Language Mirrors Statutory Language Regarding 
Definitions Critical to Analyzing Flytenow 
The definition of “interstate air transportation” in Title 14 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations mirrors the definition found in Title 49 of the 
United States Code.54 Again, it is important to note that 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 
does not define the common-law term, “common carrier.”55 
ii. Commercial Pilots Require a Higher Level of Certification than 
Private Pilots 
Section 61 of C.F.R. Title 14 (Part 61) contains several important 
provisions delineating the differences in the licensing of, and the 
privileges afforded to, private and commercial pilots. These provisions are 
significant because they dictate the required licensing for pilots engaged 
in “common carriage.” For instance, the FAA issues varying levels of 
certifications to pilots based on the pilot’s training and experience level. 
These certifications include, among others, student pilot, private pilot, 
commercial pilot, and airline transport pilot.56 For the purposes of this 
Comment, only the differences between private pilots and commercial 
pilots matter because only pilots with a commercial pilot certificate are 
allowed to engage in “common carriage.” 
Generally, “no person who holds a private pilot certificate may act as 
pilot in command of an aircraft that is carrying passengers or property for 
compensation or hire.”57 Essentially, carrying passengers for 
compensation, the touchstone of “common carriage,” is not permissible 
for private pilots. Although private pilots are not authorized to engage in 
“common carriage,” they are authorized to seek repayment from fellow 
passengers to offset the costs of a flight.58 This “expense-sharing” carve-
out was crucial to Flytenow’s business model and to its argument before 
                                                     
53. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–198.17 (2017). 
54. See id. § 1.1. 
55. See id. 
56. Id. § 61.5(a). 
57. Id. § 61.113(a) (emphasis added). 
58. Id. § 61.113(c) (a private pilot seeking reimbursement, though, cannot pay less than his pro-
rata share of the expenses). 
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the D.C. Circuit.59 The regulatory carve-out stated that a “private pilot 
may . . . [seek compensation for] the pro rata share of the operating 
expenses of a flight with passengers, provided the expenses involve only 
fuel, oil, airport expenditures, or rental fees.”60 Essentially, Flytenow 
asserted that its pilots were merely utilizing the “expense-sharing”61 
carve-out provided for by regulation. Flytenow argued that expense-
sharing was distinct from engaging in “common carriage” as defined by 
the FAA.62 
Commercial pilots, on the other hand, enjoy all of the privileges of 
private pilots, with the additional ability to carry “persons or property for 
compensation or hire”63 without the strictures of the “expense-sharing 
rule.”64 The distinction between private pilots and commercial pilots is 
critical because the FAA, in its response to Flytenow’s request for a legal 
interpretation regarding the legality of its business,65 determined that 
Flytenow needed pilots with commercial pilot certificates operating under 
a commercial air carrier certificate. The FAA based this determination 
on its assessment that Flytenow’s pilots were engaged in “common 
carriage.”66 The FAA ruled that Flytenow’s private pilots could not avail 
themselves of the “expense-sharing” exception.67 
iii. The FAA Requires Enhanced Certification Standards for 
Commercial Aviation Operations 
General aviation and commercial aviation, like private and commercial 
pilots, have critical differences that play an important role in Flytenow’s 
outcome. General aviation and commercial aviation are governed by 
separate regulations.68 These differences are important in Flytenow 
because a pilot flying as a “common carrier” engages in commercial 
                                                     
59. See infra section 1.D.1. 
60. 14 C.F.R. § 61.113(c). 
61. See Winton letter, supra note 32, at J.A. 49. 
62. See supra section I.D.2. 
63. 14 C.F.R. § 61.133(a)(1). 
64. See id. §§ 61.121–61.133 (for regulations governing commercial pilots). 
65. See Winton Interpretation, supra note 31. 
66. Id.; see also MacPherson Interpretation, supra note 32. 
67. See Winton Interpretation, supra note 31; MacPherson Interpretation, supra note 32. 
68. See 14 C.F.R. § 91 (for rules governing general aviation); id. § 119 (for rules governing 
commercial aviation). 
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aviation and is governed by specific regulations targeted at commercial 
aviation. 
Section 91 of C.F.R. Title 14 (Part 91) lays out the foundational rules 
for operating aircraft in the national airspace.69 These rules, commonly 
referred to as general aviation flight rules, apply to every pilot—whether 
private, commercial, or otherwise—in the United States.70 In addition to 
Part 91, § 119 of C.F.R. Title 14 (Part 119) adds additional requirements 
for commercial carriers (those engaged in “common carriage”). Part 119 
applies to any pilot transporting passengers for compensation (“common 
carriage”). It requires that anyone engaging in commercial air operations 
have both a commercial pilot certificate and authorization from the FAA 
as an air carrier. After reviewing a request from Flytenow for a legal 
interpretation regarding the legality of its business, the FAA concluded 
that each pilot participating in Flytenow’s flight-sharing service required 
a Part 119 certificate.71 In other words, for the FAA to consider Flytenow 
a legal operation, its pilots needed to be commercial pilots in possession 
of a commercial air carrier certificate because they were engaged in what 
the FAA deemed to be “common carriage.”72 
iv. The FAA Defined “Common Carriage” in an Informal Advisory 
Circular 
The definition of “common carriage” is the final regulatory issue key 
to understanding Flytenow. “Common carriage” is a common-law 
concept73 codified in Title 49 of the United States Code.74 The Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 uses the term “common carriage” but does not 
define it.75 In 1986, the FAA determined that it would be helpful to 
promulgate an advisory circular with “guidelines giving general 
explanations of the term ‘common carriage’ and its opposite, ‘private 
                                                     
69. Id. § 91.1(b) (“[T]his part prescribes rules governing the operation of aircraft . . . within the 
United States, including the waters within 3 nautical miles of the U.S. coast.”). 
70. See id. § 91.1(c). 
71. See Winton Interpretation, supra note 31. 
72. See id. 
73. The term “common carriage” has historically been used in the context of railroads, maritime, 
and communications. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) 
(communications); Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 237 U.S. 434 (1915) (railroads); Liverpool 
& G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889) (maritime). 
74. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25) (2012) (defining “interstate air transportation” as the 
“transportation of passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation”). 
75. See Advisory Circular, supra note 35, at J.A. 30. 
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carriage.’”76 FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A states that an air carrier 
becomes a “common carrier,” or engages in “common carriage,” when it 
“‘holds itself out’ to the public . . . as willing to furnish 
transportation . . . to any person who wants it.”77 The Advisory Circular 
then goes on to define the phrase “holding out.” An air carrier holds itself 
out through the actions of agents that seek out passengers from the general 
public.78 In later interpretative decisions, the FAA concluded that “signs 
and advertising are the most direct means [of holding out], but not the 
only methods.”79 The FAA went on to state that “advertising is not 
confined to print media, such as magazines or newspapers, and advancing 
technology allows one to quickly reach a large audience through the 
electronic communications and internet posts.”80 Notably, the “holding 
out” that makes a pilot “a common carrier can be done in many ways and 
it does not matter how it is done.”81 The FAA relied on the Advisory 
Circular definition of “common carriage” in its interpretative letter 
disallowing Flytenow’s business, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed FAA’s 
definition of “common carriage” when it upheld the FAA’s decision. The 
FAA’s definition of “common carriage” is instrumental to understanding 
Part III’s analysis.82 
C. A Brief Overview of Judicial Deference Doctrines 
Administrative law judicial deference doctrines play a key role in the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Flytenow. These doctrines explain how much a 
court is willing to defer to a federal agency’s decision-making process and 
rationale when the court conducts a review of the agency’s decision. This 
Comment discusses three major judicial deference doctrines used to 
                                                     
76. See id. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at J.A. 31. 
79. See Legal Interpretation to Mark Haberkorn from Rebecca MacPherson, Assistant Chief 
Counsel, Fed. Aviation Admin. (Oct. 3, 2011) (J.A. at 42, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-01168)). 
80. Id. 
81. See Advisory Circular, supra note 35, at J.A. 30 (emphasis added). 
82. In section III.A, this Comment discusses three potential judicial deference doctrines available 
to the D.C. Circuit when deciding Flytenow. Section III.B.3 ultimately concludes that the FAA’s 
decision on how to define the common law term “common carriage” should receive Skidmore 
deference. 
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review agency decision-making: Chevron deference, Auer deference, and 
Skidmore83 deference. 
1. Chevron Deference 
Courts can apply Chevron deference when ruling on agency 
interpretations of statutes.84 Courts utilize a two-part test to determine if 
Chevron deference applies.85 
First, . . . [courts ask] whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary 
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the . . . [courts then ask if] the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.86 
Before conducting a Chevron analysis though, the court will determine 
whether: 
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision 
qualifies for Chevron deference . . . [by asking whether 1)] it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules carrying the force of law . . . and [2) 
whether] . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.87 
This preliminary inquiry, known as Chevron “step zero,”88 is used by 
courts to determine whether it should proceed with the Chevron “two-
step” test.89 Chevron “step zero,” as first applied in Christensen v. Harris 
                                                     
83. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
84. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 842–43. 
87. VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44954, CHEVRON 
DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 6 (2017). 
88. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
89. See supra section I.C.1 (explaining the two-part Chevron test); see, e.g., Bradley George 
Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron 
Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 457 n.53 (2013). 
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County90 and later refined in United States v. Mead,91 notes that Chevron 
deference only applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority 
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that 
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”92 Agencies meet Chevron “step zero” for 
interpretations and regulations that are the “fruits of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication.”93 
2. Auer Deference 
Courts can apply Auer deference when ruling on agency interpretations 
of agency regulations.94 The Court first espoused this doctrine in Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,95 when it held that an administrative 
interpretation has “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”96 In Auer v. Robbins,97 the Supreme 
Court expanded Seminole Rock deference to include agency 
interpretations articulated in amicus curiae briefs, holding that there is 
“simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”98 In 
Auer, the Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of a 
provision within a Department of Labor regulation.99 The Department 
promulgated the regulation in question, a salary level test used to define 
                                                     
90. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of 
which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference”). 
91. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
92. Id. at 226–27. 
93. Id. at 230. 
94. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Derek A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer 
Deference: Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1723 n.10 
(2014). 
95. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
96. Id. at 414. 
97. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
98. Id. at 462.  
99. See id. at 461. 
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“executive, administrative, or professional” workers, because the Fair 
Labor Standards Act did not explicitly define those terms.100 
Auer deference is extremely deferential to agency decision making,101 
but this standard of review has several important limitations. In 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beechum Corp.,102 the Supreme Court held that 
agency interpretations of regulations that imposed liability for actions 
taken before the agency publicly announced its interpretation would 
constitute an “unfair surprise” and would thus not be subject to Auer 
deference.103 In Gonzales v. Oregon,104 the Supreme Court articulated 
another exception to Auer deference. This exception, known as the anti-
parroting canon, gives no deference to agency regulatory interpretation 
when the interpreted regulation “merely repeats the words of the statute 
without elaboration on a particular point.”105 Auer’s high level of 
deference is not extended in this situation because by simply repeating 
statutory language in its own regulation, the agency is actually 
interpreting the statute, not the regulation.106 If the statute and the 
regulation use the same language, courts conclude that the statute and the 
regulation must have identical meanings.107 When a court finds that Auer 
deference does not apply because of the anti-parroting exception, the court 
will look to apply either Skidmore108 or Chevron109 deference, depending 
on the facts of the case.110 
3. Skidmore Deference 
Finally, when a court decides that neither Chevron nor Auer deference 
applies to a case, it has a third option of giving an agency’s decision 
Skidmore deference. A judicial grant of Skidmore deference depends on 
the following: whether 1) the agency was thorough in its consideration of 
the issue; 2) the agency used valid reasoning in coming to its decision; 3) 
                                                     
100. See id. at 454. 
101. Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290, 292 (2011) 
(describing “Auer deference as being even stronger than the level of deference given in Chevron 
cases”). 
102. 567 U.S. 142 (2012). 
103. Id. at 156. 
104. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
105. Volokh, supra note 101, at 292. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. at 295. 
108. See infra section I.C.3 (discussing Skidmore deference). 
109. See supra section I.C.1 (discussing Chevron deference). 
110. See Volokh, supra note 101, at 292. 
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the decision was consistent with earlier and later decisions made with 
similar circumstances; and 4) any other factor which has the “power to 
persuade” the court.111 Essentially, if the agency provides a convincing 
argument to the court for why its decision is correct, the court will defer 
to the agency’s decision. 
D. Flytenow’s Legal Challenge to the FAA’s Interpretative Letter 
After receiving the FAA’s legal interpretation on August 14, 2014, 
Flytenow filed a petition for review with the D.C. Circuit on September 
5, 2014, challenging the FAA’s decision.112 After oral arguments, the 
court upheld the FAA’s determination.113 Flytenow’s request for an en 
banc hearing at the D.C. Circuit114 and its petition for a writ of certiorari 
from the U.S. Supreme Court115 were both denied. This Comment will 
only discuss the issues in Flytenow pertinent for an analysis of the proper 
level of deference afforded to federal agencies for their interpretations of 
common-law terms in statutes and regulations.116 
1. Flytenow Alleged the FAA Interpretation Was “Arbitrary and 
Capricious” and Not Worthy of Deference 
Flytenow’s main argument was that in the legal interpretations issued 
to AirPooler and Flytenow, collectively referred to as the MacPherson-
Winton Interpretation,117 the FAA exceeded its regulatory authority.118 
Flytenow argued that “[s]ince the FAA has interpreted only common law 
terms . . . and because the FAA . . . radically departed from previous 
interpretations and precedent, the MacPherson-Winton Interpretation is 
entitled to no deference . . . .”119 In addition to arguing that the FAA’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it diverged from statutorily 
permissible expense-sharing, Flytenow argued that the FAA’s 
interpretation warranted no deference because the MacPherson-Winton 
Interpretation relied upon the FAA’s own definitions for the common-law 
                                                     
111. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
112. Petition for Review, Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-01168). 
113. See Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 890. 
114. Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882, petition for en banc hearing denied, No. 14-01168, 2016 BL 54722 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2016). 
115. Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 618 (2017). 
116. Discussed extensively in section III.B infra. 
117. See supra notes 31–32. 
118. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-01168). 
119. Id. 
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terms “holding out,” “common carriage,” and “common purpose.”120 
Flytenow argued that because the FAA used common-law concepts 
instead of rules reflecting its administrative expertise,121 the court should 
review the FAA’s interpretation de novo, or at most give the FAA only 
Skidmore122 deference.123 Additionally, Flytenow argued that Chevron 
deference124 did not apply in this case. Flytenow cited International 
Longshoremen’s Assoc. v. National Labor Relations Board,125  asserting 
that when the court is “confronted with a question regarding the meaning 
of [a statutory] provision incorporating common law . . . principles, [it] 
need not defer to the agency’s judgment as [it] normally might under the 
doctrine of Chevron.”126 
2. The FAA Cited Auer, Claiming Its Interpretation Was Reasonable 
and Should Be Upheld 
The FAA opened its argument by asserting that its finding that 
Flytenow’s pilots were common carriers was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law.127 It argued that Auer 
deference128 was the appropriate standard of review for its legal 
interpretation, asserting that, at a minimum, the agency’s interpretation of 
its own regulations was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation[s].”129 
The FAA argued that the “only dispute in this case centers around 
whether Flytenow pilots are ‘common carriers’ within the meaning of the 
agency’s definition.”130 To buttress its argument, the FAA noted that any 
person with internet access can view flights on Flytenow’s website simply 
by applying for membership to the website. The FAA indicated that open 
viewing, combined with the lack of evidence Flytenow ever denied 
                                                     
120. Id. at 29. 
121. Id. at 30 (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968) (“A determination 
of pure [common] law involve[s] no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess.”)). 
122. See supra section I.C.3.  
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 29. 
124. See supra section I.C.1. 
125. 56 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
126. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 29–30 (citing Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, 
56 F.3d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  
127. Brief for Respondent at 15, Flytenow, 808 F.3d 882 (No. 14-1168). 
128. See supra section I.C.2 for a brief overview of Auer deference.  
129. Brief for Respondent, supra note 127, at 21 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 
(1997)). 
130. Id. at 17. This is the main point of dispute that this Comment will address in Part III infra. 
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membership to a prospective passenger, made Flytenow a common 
carrier.131 Additionally, the FAA argued that in “1985 . . . the FAA 
concluded that pilots participating in a service to match them with 
passengers willing to share expenses under the predecessor to § 61.113(c) 
were ‘probably engaged in common carriage’ and thus subject to the 
certification rules that preceded Part 119.”132 
3. The D.C. Circuit Ruled in Favor of the FAA 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied Flytenow’s challenge of the 
FAA’s MacPherson-Winton Interpretation, holding that the FAA’s 
interpretation was consistent with the statute and the FAA’s 
regulations.133 The court held that when it considers challenges to an 
agency’s interpretation of its regulations, Auer deference applies unless 
the agency’s interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”134 The court went on to say that even if it did not apply Auer 
deference to the MacPherson-Winton Interpretation, it would still have 
no problem affirming the FAA’s interpretations of its own regulations in 
Flytenow.135 
The court explicitly referenced the FAA’s regulations—regulations 
that interpreted the common-law—in its opinion. It pointed to the 
language of FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A,136 stating that “[u]nder the 
definition of ‘holding out’ the FAA articulated in the 1986 circular . . . we 
have no trouble finding that Flytenow’s pilots would be doing so.”137 The 
court also agreed with the FAA’s position that “no ‘conclusive proof’ that 
a pilot is not a common carrier can be gleaned from the absence of rate 
schedules, or pilots occasionally refusing service or offering it only 
pursuant to separately negotiated contracts.”138 Finally, and of greatest 
importance for the purposes of this Comment, the D.C. Circuit refused to 
engage in any discussion of the FAA’s definition of the common-law term 
                                                     
131. See id. at 18. 
132. Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 
133. Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. 
Ct. 618 (2017). 
134. Id. at 890. 
135. Id. 
136. See Advisory Circular, supra note 35. 
137. Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 892. 
138. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“common carriage.”139 The D.C. Circuit simply avoided the issue by 
holding that any argument made over the FAA’s definition of common 
carriage was forfeited because Flytenow did not contest the definition in 
its opening brief to the court.140 This sidestep by the court left open a 
question that this Comment will attempt to answer in Parts II and III: what 
is the proper level of deference a court should give an agency for its 
definition of a common-law term? 
II. WHEN THREE WORLDS COLLIDE: THE ROLES OF 
CONGRESS, COURTS, AND AGENCIES IN USING AND 
INTERPRETING THE COMMON LAW 
Part II provides the legal framework for analyzing whether the D.C. 
Circuit gave the FAA an appropriate level of deference in Flytenow. 
Congress, the judiciary, and federal agencies all have a role to play in the 
use and interpretation of common-law terms in statutes and regulations. 
First, this Part provides a brief overview of Congress’s use of common-
law terms within federal statutes and the principles that guide courts when 
issues regarding the meaning of those common-law terms arise in 
litigation. Second, this Part explains that courts commonly give deference 
to agency interpretations of common-law terms within their respective 
areas of expertise, but give little or no deference to interpretations of 
common-law terms outside the agency’s field of expertise. Finally, Part II 
concludes with an analysis of how courts generally approach agency 
interpretations of common-law terms in the aviation context. 
A. When Congress Uses a Common-Law Term in a Statute, It Intends 
for That Term to Assume Its Common-Law Meaning 
In the United States, the common law serves two roles: 1) it is an 
independent source of authority, and 2) in some cases, it influences and 
informs the development of statutory law.141 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines the term “common law” as the “body of law derived from judicial 
decisions.”142 Several venerable rules of statutory interpretation govern 
how courts deal with disputes involving the meaning of common-law 
                                                     
139. Id. at 893 (internal citations omitted); see infra section III.A for analysis of whether the D.C. 
Circuit erred in its willingness to afford the FAA Advisory Circular Auer deference and how Flytenow 
should have attacked the FAA’s definition of common carriage. 
140. Id. 
141. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 545, 549 (2007). 
142. Common law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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terms. First, when Congress uses a common-law term in a statute, 
“Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common 
law terms it uses.”143 Further, “where Congress borrows terms of art in 
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was 
taken.”144 Put another way, “if a word is obviously transplanted from 
another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it 
brings the old soil with it.”145 Finally, when interpreting statutes that 
integrate common-law concepts, courts must remember that Congress did 
not write the statute on “a clean slate.”146 Generally, “[i]n order [for 
Congress] to abrogate a common law principle, the statute must ‘speak 
directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.”147 
United States v. Shabani148 is a clear example of the notion that when 
Congress uses a common-law term in a statute, it intends for that term to 
take on its common-law meaning. In Shabani, a criminal defendant was 
charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846.149 Section 846 of Title 21 discusses liability for 
conspiracy in drug-related offenses.150 The defendant wanted a jury 
instruction that would define conspiracy as requiring “an overt act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”151 Section 846 does not define conspiracy, 
so the court refused this jury instruction, noting that “precedent did not 
require the allegation of an overt act in the indictment.”152 After granting 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that “absent contrary 
indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of 
statutory terms.”153 To bolster this statement, the Court looked to the 
general conspiracy statute154 and found “an explicit requirement that a 
                                                     
143. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). 
144. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also LARRY M. EIG, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT 
TRENDS 7 (2011).  
145. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 
(1947). 
146. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (citations omitted). 
147. Id. (citations omitted). 
148. 513 U.S. 10 (1994). 
149. Id. at 11. 
150. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). 
151. Shabani, 513 U.S. at 11. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 13. 
154. The general conspiracy statute referenced by the court is 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
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conspirator ‘do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.’”155 Based 
on this finding, it reasoned that Congress had the chance to include an 
overt act in the conspiracy definition found in 21 U.S.C. § 846, but its 
choice not to include this spoke “volumes” as to its intent.156 Congress, by 
not defining conspiracy in 21 U.S.C. § 846, intended the term to take on 
its common-law meaning. Shabani clearly illustrates the basic statutory 
interpretation principle that if Congress does not provide a specific 
definition for a common-law term in a statute, it intends for that term to 
assume its common-law meaning. 
Only in very limited and narrow circumstances will courts allow a 
common-law term to assume a meaning different than its meaning at 
common law. Despite the Court’s language in United States v. Texas157 
requiring Congress to speak directly to abrogate common-law principles, 
courts can choose to give common-law terms a different meaning without 
a direct decree from Congress. In Taylor v. United States,158 the Court 
declined to give the term “burglary,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), its 
common-law definition.159 The Court noted that it had previously 
“declined to follow any rule that a statutory term is to be given its 
common-law meaning, when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with 
the statute’s purpose.”160 The Court acknowledged that Congress likely 
had a derivation of the common-law definition of burglary in mind when 
crafting the statute. However, the Court held that it would be erroneous to 
apply the common-law conception of burglary to the statutory language 
because the “contemporary understanding of ‘burglary’ has diverged a 
long way from its common law roots.”161 Essentially, a common-law term 
                                                     
155. Shabani, 513 U.S. at 14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371). 
156. Id.  
157. See 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
158. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
159. See id. at 598. 
160. Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added). 
161. Id. at 593. 
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used in a statute will be given its common-law meaning unless that 
meaning diverges from the purpose of the statute itself.162 
B. Courts Do Not Always Give Deference to Agency Interpretations 
Involving the Common Law 
Courts give agencies varying levels of deference for their 
interpretations of statutes and regulations.163 These deference doctrines 
are based on the notion that agencies have more “expertise [than courts] 
in the area they regulate.”164 Despite courts’ willingness to defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations of the law, “[w]hen the administrative 
interpretation is not based on expertise in the particular field, . . . but is 
based on general common law principles, great deference is not 
required.”165 In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission,166 the Jicarilla Apache Tribe challenged an order from the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denying it a “small 
producer” certificate because it “purchased” its gas from a larger 
producer.167 The FERC “relied primarily on property concepts developed 
and enunciated by the common law” when interpreting the term 
“purchase.”168 The court disagreed with the FERC’s interpretation of the 
term “purchase,” and remanded the case to the FERC for further 
proceedings.169 In remanding the case, the court explained that because 
“the decision of the Commission was explicitly based upon the 
applicability of principles of law announced by courts, its validity [or 
invalidity] must likewise be judged on that basis.”170 Jicarilla stands for 
                                                     
162. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). 
163. See supra section I.C for a brief discussion of Skidmore, Chevron, and Auer deference 
doctrines. 
164. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 
1978). 
165. Id. at 292–93 (citing Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Corp., 363 U.S. 263, 270 
(1960)). In Texas Gas, the court refused to give deference to Federal Power Commission decision that 
professed to use “canons of contract construction employed by the courts” because the Commission 
“did not in any wise rely on matters within its special competence.” 363 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added). 
166. 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978). 
167. See id. at 292. 
168. Id. at 293. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)). 
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the notion that agencies receive minimal deference when they interpret 
common-law terms outside of their areas of expertise. 
Even if an agency interprets a common-law term within its area of 
expertise, agencies sometimes may still receive no deference from the 
court. In International Longshoremen’s Assoc. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, the D.C. Circuit tackled the issue of judicial deference 
to agency interpretations of common-law terms within its area of 
expertise.171 In International Longshoremen’s, the International 
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) challenged a National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) determination that it violated the National Labor 
Relations Act “by establishing a secondary boycott through the actions of 
its putative agents.”172 The ILA, through discussions with its counterparts 
in Japan, asked Japanese stevedores to refuse to unload produce not 
loaded by ILA stevedores in Florida.173 The NLRB held that this 
coordination on the part of the ILA made the Japanese stevedores an agent 
for the ILA.174 
On review, the D.C. Circuit disagreed, giving only “limited deference 
to the Board’s agency law analysis.”175 The court noted that “when 
confronted with a question regarding the meaning of an NLRB provision 
incorporating common law agency principles, we need not defer to the 
agency’s judgment as we normally might under the doctrine of” 
Chevron.176 Instead, the court stated that “in a situation of this sort, we 
must give due weight to the Board’s judgment to the extent that ‘it made 
a choice between two fairly conflicting views.’”177 In International 
Longshoremen’s, the court gave no deference to the NLRB’s 
determination that the Japanese stevedores were the ILA’s agents, noting 
that the NLRB’s decision was not “‘a choice between two fairly 
conflicting views,’ . . . [because] the Japanese unions were in no sense the 
agents of the ILA.”178 In sum, International Longshoremen’s shows that 
an agency will not necessarily receive deference for its interpretation of 
common-law issues that are arguably within its area of expertise. An 
agency’s interpretation will only receive deference if the agency chooses 
between one of two (or more) reasonable interpretations. If the agency’s 
                                                     
171. 56 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
172. Id. at 206–07. 
173. See id. at 207. 
174. See id. 
175. Id. at 212. 
176. Id.  
177. Id. (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968)). 
178. Id. at 213. 
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interpretation fails to make a choice between two or more reasonable 
options, its interpretation will receive no deference. 
C. Courts Generally Defer to Agency Interpretations of the Term 
“Common Carrier” in the Aviation Context 
The term, “common carrier,” is used in a variety of industries.179 This 
section will examine how courts deal with the common-law term, 
“common carrier,” in the aviation context. “Common carrier” is a well-
known term with its origins in the common law.180 The determination of 
whether an air carrier is a common carrier is made using “the same 
principles as are applied in the cases of carriers by other means.”181 In the 
air carrier context, the term maintains its common-law meaning because 
it is essentially the same action: transportation of passengers, regardless 
of the mode of travel.182 
In Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,183 Las Vegas 
Hacienda (Hacienda) challenged a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) order 
to cease and desist from offering free airplane rides from Los Angeles, 
California, to its resort in Las Vegas, Nevada.184 The CAB claimed 
Hacienda was engaged in common carriage without proper 
certification.185 Before conducting its analysis, the court noted that 
“[w]hether the Board has chosen correctly” in determining that Hacienda 
is a common carrier and needed certification “is, of course, subject to 
review by this court, for an agency may not finally decide the limits of its 
statutory power. That is a judicial function.”186 It went on to state, though, 
that “the Board’s decisions in these cases [determining if companies are 
common carriers] involve the application of technical knowledge which 
the Board, and not the court, is presumed to have.”187 The court then went 
on to examine the CAB’s finding that Hacienda operated as a common 
carrier188 and the sufficiency of the test used by the CAB to make that 
                                                     
179. See supra note 73. 
180. CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
181. Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488, 490 (8th Cir. 1959). 
182. See Curtiss Wright Flying Serv. v. Glose, 66 F.2d 710, 712 (3rd Cir. 1933). 
183. 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962). 
184. See id. at 432. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
187. Id. at 433–34. 
188. Id. at 434–35. Evidence included the following facts: Hacienda “conducted regularly 
scheduled passenger flights”; in planes it owned; the planes were staffed with its own employees; the 
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determination.189 The court ultimately determined that “the record 
contained substantial support for the Board’s conclusion that Hacienda 
was a common carrier for compensation or hire.”190 Hacienda 
demonstrates the idea that, at least in the aviation context, courts reserve 
for themselves an important role in assessing the validity of agency 
interpretations of common-law terms. Courts must play an important 
reviewing role of agency interpretations, even if those interpretations are 
within the agency’s unique area of technical expertise. 
In Woolsey v. National Transportation Safety Board,191 Woolsey 
challenged an FAA order revoking his commercial pilot’s certification for 
“failure to comply with the safety requirements for pilots operating 
aircraft for a common carrier” under 14 C.F.R. § 135 (Part 135).192 
Woolsey was the president of Prestige Touring, Inc. (PTI), a small air 
carrier dedicated to transporting musicians.193 He argued that PTI was not 
engaged in common carriage and thus should be subject to the provisions 
of Part 91 (General Aviation), not Part 135 (Commercial Aviation).194 The 
Fifth Circuit disagreed with Woolsey, upholding the FAA’s determination 
that he was, in fact, engaged in common carriage.195 The court remarked 
that because the term common carrier was not defined in statute or 
regulations, it had to consult other sources.196 Of the other sources the 
court considered to determine whether PTI was a common carrier, the 
court focused most on the common law relating to air carriers.197 The court 
did not address the legal sufficiency of FAA Advisory Circular 120-12A, 
holding that its definition of common carrier was “in relevant respect the 
                                                     
flights “departed from regular commercial airports”; and “[p]assengers received the usual air terminal 
services: a check-in counter, boarding passes, flight calls, and the assistance of ground attendants” Id.  
189. Id. at 434. 
The [common carrier] test which the Board applies is an objective one, relying upon what the 
carrier actually does rather than upon the label which the carrier attaches to its activity or the 
purpose which motivates it. So long as the air carrier is competing commercially in the market 
for the patronage of the general public, the Board holds that it is immaterial that the service 
offered will be attractive only to a limited group; or that it may be performed pursuant to special 
contract. And it is also immaterial that in terms of the carrier’s own bookkeeping the 
transportation may be furnished at cost, at a loss, or even without charge. 
190. Id. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191. 993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993). 
192. Id. at 517. 
193. Id.  
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 525. 
196. Id. at 522. 
197. Id. 
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same as that found at common law.”198 The court also noted that in the 
Advisory Circular, the FAA did not seek “to broaden the definition of 
common carriage.”199 Ultimately, the court found that the National 
Transportation Safety Board was justified in classifying PTI as a common 
carrier because it 1) “held itself out as being willing to serve all members 
of the music industry who were able to pay for its services,” and 2) never 
turned away a musician that could pay for its services.200 
Woolsey is an excellent guide for courts analyzing issues that concern 
agency interpretations of the common-law terms in the aviation context. 
The Woolsey court took notice of the agency’s interpretation of a 
common-law term, determined that the interpretation aligned with the 
common law, and subsequently allowed the agency’s determination to 
stand.201 
III. COURTS SHOULD RELY ON SKIDMORE DEFERENCE 
WHEN ANALYZING AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETATION OF 
A COMMON-LAW TERM 
As a general matter, the FAA exists to ensure the safety of air 
commerce and transportation in the United States.202 Requiring 
Flytenow’s pilots to obtain commercial pilot certificates and to register as 
air carriers under Part 119203 is a common-sense policy position for an 
agency tasked with ensuring the safety of the flying public. Ensuring that 
Flytenow used more experienced pilots and that the FAA would subject 
those pilots, as individual air carriers, to greater scrutiny seemingly 
dovetails with the stated purposes of statutory and regulatory schemes 
governing the FAA—the safety of the general public. 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion upholding the FAA’s MacPherson-Winton 
Interpretation because the interpretation was “consistent with the relevant 
statutory and regulatory provisions”204 raises no obvious issues. Using its 
interpretation of the term “common carrier” as defined in FAA Advisory 
Circular 120-12A, the FAA correctly applied its interpretation to the 
Flytenow matter. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Flytenow, though, masks 
an important issue in administrative law jurisprudence: should courts give 
                                                     
198. Id. at 523. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 524. 
201. See id. at 525. 
202. See supra note 41. 
203. Winton Interpretation, supra note 31, at J.A. 61. 
204. Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. 
Ct. 618 (2017). 
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agencies either Chevron or Auer deference for their interpretations of 
common-law terms? Part II showed that courts will generally give 
deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a common-law term 
within its sole area of expertise, but will usually give little or no deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of common-law terms outside its area of 
expertise. Part III aims to show how Chevron and Auer deference have 
the potential to upend this concept by allowing courts to bypass a 
principled review of an agency’s use of a common-law term. A court’s 
grant of either Chevron or Auer deference to an agency for its 
interpretation of common-law terms robs the court of its historical role in 
making, maintaining, and protecting the common law. 
Using the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Flytenow as a guide for analyzing 
this issue, this Part ultimately argues that courts should review agency 
interpretations of common-law terms de novo, only giving Skidmore 
deference to the agency interpretation to the extent that the interpretation 
is aligned with the term’s traditional common-law meaning. This ensures 
that the judiciary maintains its role as the gatekeeper to the common law. 
First, this Part argues that the D.C. Circuit erred in mentioning Auer 
deference while coming to its decision in Flytenow. Second, this Part will 
examine the level of deference the D.C. Circuit actually afforded the FAA 
in Flytenow and whether that level of deference was appropriate. Finally, 
and most importantly, this Part will analyze the proper level of deference 
courts should give to agency interpretations of common-law terms to 
ensure that the judiciary remains the keeper of the common law. 
A. The D.C. Circuit Erred When It Discussed Auer Deference in 
Flytenow 
1. Auer Deference Is Inapposite for Discussion in Flytenow 
When beginning its discussion of Flytenow’s claim that its pilots did 
not engage in “common carriage,” the D.C. Circuit remarked that “[w]hen 
we consider a challenge to the FAA’s interpretation of its own regulations, 
the familiar Auer v. Robbins framework requires us to treat the agency’s 
interpretation as controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.’”205 This seemingly innocuous recitation of the 
fundamentals of Auer deference is unwarranted and unnecessary based on 
the facts of the case. The facts of Flytenow do not support a reference to 
Auer deference because of Gonzales’s anti-parroting exception to Auer 
deference. In Flytenow, the common-law term “common carrier” used in 
the statutory and regulatory definition of “interstate air transportation” 
                                                     
205. Id. at 889–90. 
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was at the center of the dispute between Flytenow and the FAA. Recall 
that both the governing statute and the regulation use the exact same 
definition for “interstate air transportation,” and neither the statute, nor 
the regulation, define “common carrier.”206 The FAA instead chose to 
define the term “common carrier” in an informal Advisory Circular.207 
Because the definition of “interstate air transportation” in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 
mirrors the definition found in 49 U.S.C. § 40102, when the FAA defined 
“common carrier” in the Advisory Circular, it was actually interpreting a 
statute (49 U.S.C. § 40102), not its own regulation (14 C.F.R. § 1.1). Per 
Gonzales, discussed above, Auer deference does not apply when an 
agency interprets a regulation that parrots a statute. 
2. The D.C. Circuit Should Have Discussed and Relied Upon Either 
Chevron or Skidmore Deference, Instead of Auer 
Instead of mentioning Auer deference in its opinion, the D.C. Circuit 
would have been more aligned with modern understandings of judicial 
deference to discuss the applicability of Chevron and Skidmore deference. 
When agencies interpret statutes, as is the case in Flytenow, courts look 
to whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies to those 
interpretations.208 
i. Chevron Is Not Applicable to Flytenow 
Had the D.C. Circuit completed a Chevron deference analysis in 
Flytenow, it would have ultimately determined that Chevron deference 
did not apply to the FAA’s interpretation of the common-law term 
“common carriage.” 
The D.C. Circuit would not have afforded the FAA Chevron deference 
for its definition of “common carriage” because that definition was 
promulgated in an informal Advisory Circular, not through an 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) approved rulemaking process. This 
means that the Chevron deference analysis would have failed Chevron 
“step zero.”209 Advisory Circular 120-12A was not developed and 
published pursuant to informal (notice-and-comment) or formal 
rulemaking procedures outlined in the APA.210 The Advisory Circular was 
                                                     
206. See supra notes 49 and 54. 
207. See supra section I.B.2.iv. 
208. See Volokh, supra note 101, at 292. 
209. See supra section I.C.1 for a discussion of Chevron “step zero.” 
210. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–557 (2012) (providing a description of the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s formal and informal rulemaking procedures). 
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not the fruit of notice-and-comment rulemaking as is required by Mead. 
It is more akin to an interpretative memo, as it gives “guidelines”211 for 
determining what constitutes a common carrier. In this respect, the 
Advisory Circular lacks the “force of law” and would does not warrant 
Chevron deference. 
With Auer and Chevron deference inapplicable in Flytenow, if the D.C. 
Circuit wanted to defer to the FAA’s definition of “common carriage,” it 
could only rely upon Skidmore deference to justify its decision. 
ii. The D.C. Circuit, Without Explicit Reference, Seemingly Decided 
Flytenow Using Skidmore Deference 
The D.C. Circuit likely used Skidmore deference212 when making its 
decision in Flytenow to uphold both the FAA’s interpretation of the term 
“common carrier” and the agency’s decision to shut down Flytenow’s 
business. While the term “Skidmore” does not appear in the court’s 
opinion,213 its reliance on Skidmore deference is clear. Courts may afford 
Skidmore deference if: 1) the court thinks that the agency’s course of 
action was persuasive and that the agency was thorough in its 
consideration of the issue; 2) the agency used valid reasoning in coming 
to its decision; and 3) the decision was consistent with earlier and later 
decisions made in similar circumstances.214 
The court explicitly noted that Flytenow’s objection to the “holding 
out” component of common carriage was “unpersuasive.”215 Additionally, 
because Flytenow did not challenge the FAA’s definition of common 
carriage in its opening brief,216 the court simply regarded the FAA’s 
definition articulated in the Advisory Circular as thoroughly considered 
and valid.217 The court even went as far as stating that Flytenow’s 
interpretation of the FAA’s definition of “common carriage” was 
“question-begging and incorrect.”218 Ultimately, even though the FAA’s 
Advisory Circular did not have the power to control the outcome of 
Flytenow as the product of the APA-approved rulemaking process, the 
                                                     
211. See Advisory Circular Part 4, supra note 35, at J.A. 30. 
212. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (deference to an agency’s judgement 
is appropriate if the agency’s decision is thorough, valid, and persuasive). 
213. See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. 
Ct. 618 (2017). 
214. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
215. Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 890 (emphasis added). 
216. Id. at 893. 
217. See id. at 892. 
218. Id. at 891. 
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court found the Advisory Circular definition of common carrier 
persuasive and, applying Skidmore, relied on it to resolve the case.219 By 
agreeing to the FAA’s definition of “common carriage,” the D.C. Circuit 
also ratified the FAA’s decision that Flytenow’s pilots were engaging in 
“common carriage” and needed to be licensed as such. The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision aligned with how courts have previously decided issues 
involving the FAA’s definition of “common carriage.” In Woolsey, the 
Fifth Circuit deferred to the FAA’s definition of “common carrier,” 
holding that the FAA’s definition was nearly the same as that found at 
common law and that the FAA did not try to seek expand the definition 
beyond its common-law bounds.220 The courts, both in Woolsey221 and 
Flytenow,222 deferred to the FAA’s interpretation of the common law only 
after examining the interpretation in question, consulting the common 
law, and becoming convinced that the two coincided. 
B. Courts Should Review Agency Interpretations of Common-Law 
Terms De Novo and, at Most, Afford These Interpretations 
Skidmore Deference 
Section III.A discussed why Auer and Chevron deference were 
inapplicable in Flytenow, and how the court ultimately decided Flytenow 
using Skidmore deference to uphold the FAA’s determination. Section 
III.B builds on that critique, laying out a reasoned analysis for the correct 
level of deference a court should give an agency for its interpretation of 
common-law terms. Although the D.C. Circuit reached the correct 
decision in Flytenow, its published opinion missed a significant 
opportunity, as the leading administrative law court in the country, to 
authoritatively answer the question of the correct level of deference to 
give to agencies for their interpretations of common-law concepts. 
Remember the Ninth Circuit’s sage guidance in Hacienda: only a court 
may determine whether an agency correctly applies the common law—an 
agency may not decide the outer limits of its statutory power.223 
A court must use care not to abdicate its crucial role as the developer 
and guardian of the common law224 by blindly granting deference to an 
                                                     
219. See supra notes 214–13215. Skidmore allows for courts to defer to agency decisions when the 
agency makes a persuasive argument. In Flytenow, the D.C. Circuit found the FAA’s arguments more 
persuasive than Flytenow’s. 
220. See Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 1993). 
221. Id.  
222. Flytenow, 808 F.3d at 890. 
223. Las Vegas Hacienda v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 298 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1962). 
224. See Jack G. Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 563, 568–69 (1976). 
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agency for its interpretation of the common law. Without careful analysis, 
courts risk allowing agencies to take a more active role in shaping the 
common law—a task that is reserved solely for courts. Say, for instance, 
that an agency issues an interpretation of a common-law term used in a 
regulation promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Interpretations of administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the notice-
and-comment process are generally granted Auer deference because 
courts are willing to defer to an agency’s judgment on topics within its 
area of specialized expertise. This level of deference does not necessarily 
make sense when an agency defines a common-law term in a regulation 
because courts, not agencies, are the experts in defining common-law 
terms. An agency’s interpretation of a common-law term might be the 
result of the agency’s considered judgment, yet it still might not fully align 
with the court’s broader understanding of the common law. 
Section III.B aims to answer these outstanding questions regarding the 
applicability of Auer and Chevron deference to agency interpretations of 
common-law terms. The question of whether courts should defer to 
agency interpretations of common-law terms comes up in two situations: 
either when an agency interprets a common-law term within a statute (a 
Chevron deference analysis), or when an agency interprets a common-law 
term in a regulation (an Auer deference analysis). 
1. Chevron Deference Should Not Extend to Agency Interpretations of 
Common-Law Terms 
Well established Chevron doctrine jurisprudence states that agencies 
receive deference for their interpretations of statutory language if 1) 
Congress gave the agency the authority to make rules with the force and 
effect of law; 2) the agency acts pursuant to that congressional grant of 
authority when issuing the rule; 3) the statute is ambiguous; and 4) the 
interpretation is based on a permissible reading of the statute.225 
One problematic question raised by a blanket grant of Chevron 
deference to interpretations of common-law terms is whether Congress 
intended to give agencies the power to define common-law terms in 
statutes, even if the agency is granted the power to issue statutory 
interpretations with the force and effect of law. When Congress purposely 
uses a common-law term in a statute without defining it, it intends for the 
agency to give the term its common-law meaning.226 Thus, any 
congressional grant of power to an administrative agency to interpret 
                                                     
225. See supra section I.C.1. 
226. See supra note 143. 
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statutory language is subordinate and subject to Congress’s clear statutory 
intent.227 When Congress includes a common-law term in a statute, the 
use of that common-law term does not create ambiguity in the statute 
because that term carries its common-law meaning.228 
If Chevron had been applicable in Flytenow,229 the court would have 
first needed to determine if anything in the statutory language or the 
legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 indicated 
Congress’s desire to give the FAA the power to define and change the 
common-law meaning of the term “common carrier.” If those indications 
were missing, to quote Justice Frankfurter, the “old soil”230—the old 
meaning—still attached to the term, regardless of what FAA’s notice-and-
comment-approved definition said. Without any congressional indication 
to the contrary, the term, common carrier, as used in the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958 maintains its common-law meaning. Before receiving 
deference for any informal clarification or interpretation of a common-
law term, that interpretation should first be subject to a probing review by 
the court and only afforded deference if the court is convinced that the 
agency’s interpretation aligns with the common-law meaning. 
Another problem raised by a blanket grant of Chevron deference to 
interpretations of common law is whether the interpretation aligns with 
other statutes in which Congress used identical common-law language. 
When Congress uses a common-law term, it intends for that term’s 
meaning to remain reasonably similar across statutes.231 It is possible for 
an agency interpretation of a common-law term to be a permissible 
construction based on one statute, but completely out of line with other 
statutes using the same common-law term. Courts must use caution to 
ensure that the agency’s interpretation of a common-law term does not 
broaden or narrow the meaning of that term so as to make it incompatible 
with other statutes.232 
In Flytenow, this Chevron concern is likely less of a problem than it 
might potentially be in other contexts. Looking back to Woolsey,233 the 
Fifth Circuit already declared that the FAA’s definition of common 
carriage in Advisory Circular 120-12A did not seek to broaden the 
                                                     
227. See supra note 146. 
228. See supra note 145. 
229. See supra section III.A.2.i for an explanation of why Chevron deference is inapplicable in 
Flytenow. 
230. See supra note 145. 
231. See supra note 144. 
232. See supra note 199. 
233. Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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traditional understanding of the term at common law.234 In other cases 
with distinct fact patterns, it is possible that an agency might promulgate 
a definition of a common-law term that did not fit within the broader 
common-law understanding of the term. In this situation, providing 
Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation might be misconstrued 
as an implicit acceptance by the court of a change of the common-law 
meaning of the term. 
2. Auer Deference Should Not Extend to Agency Interpretations of 
Common-Law Terms 
Just as traditional Chevron deference raises issues with agency 
interpretations of common-law terms in statutes, Auer deference similarly 
presents issues for agency interpretations of common-law terms in 
regulations. Under Auer and its predecessor Seminole Rock, agencies 
receive deference for their interpretation of regulatory language if 1) the 
interpretation is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, 
and 2) the interpretation represents the agency’s considered judgment.235 
However, the Auer framework does not apply neatly when applied to 
agency interpretations of common-law terms. 
First, as is the case with Chevron deference for common-law terms, a 
definition of a common-law term can be consistent with one regulation, 
yet inconsistent with another regulation promulgated by another agency. 
Common-law terms carry specific meaning and are not terms of art 
susceptible to change at the whim of agencies.236 Recall that when 
Congress uses a common-law term, it intends for that term to assume its 
common-law meaning.237 The same must be true when agencies use 
common-law terms as well. If Auer could be applied to Flytenow,238 the 
FAA’s use of the term “common carrier” in its regulations should not 
receive such a broad grant of deference without further judicial review. 
“Common carrier” is a common-law term available for use by any agency 
in a regulation. Before giving deference to any particular agency’s use of 
a common-law term, courts should ensure that the agency is using the term 
in a way that it is understood in the common law and across the various 
                                                     
234. See supra note 199. 
235. See supra section I.C.2 for an explanation of Auer deference. 
236. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 n.6 (1999). 
237. Id. at 23. 
238. Assuming, arguendo, that the argument in section III.A.1 is incorrect. 
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agencies that use the term. This ensures the stability and the precedential 
value of the common law. 
Second, even if an interpretation of a common-law term represents the 
agency’s considered judgment, it does not necessarily follow that the 
agency’s interpretation is correct at common law. When an agency 
interpretation is based on “principles of law announced by courts, its 
validity [or invalidity] must likewise be judged on that basis.”239 Courts 
do not owe agencies Auer deference “[w]hen the administrative 
interpretation is not based on expertise in the particular field . . . but is 
based on general common law principles.”240 Common-law terms are 
legal terms of art, and in a legal context, should be given their common-
law meaning, regardless of their use in a statute or an agency regulation. 
Courts can only determine if an agency’s good faith interpretation of a 
common-law term aligns with the term’s well-settled meaning in the 
common law after a probing, or at least a greater than superficial, review. 
Refusing to apply Auer deference to agency interpretations of common-
law terms in regulations allows courts to engage in a deeper, more 
meaningful analysis of an agency’s interpretation. This deeper review 
encourages courts, at the risk of minor temporal inefficiencies, to preserve 
the integrity of the common law instead of summarily and dismissively 
invoking Auer’s “plainly erroneous” standard. 
Finally, current Auer deference jurisprudence is unclear on whether 
Auer applies to informal agency interpretative guidance (guidance not 
issued pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking). This issue recently 
came before the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court vacated the lower 
court ruling and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit without 
examining the issue.241 If the Supreme Court eventually rules that Auer 
applies to informal interpretative guidance as well as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, there is a reasonable argument that an agency’s interpretation 
of a common-law term still does not warrant Auer deference. For the same 
reasons listed above (inconsistency with other agencies that use the same 
common-law term and agency lack of expertise in parsing the common 
law), Auer deference should not apply to any agency interpretation of a 
                                                     
239. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 289, 293 (10th Cir. 
1978). 
240. Id. at 292. 
241. See G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 
__ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).  
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common-law term, regardless of whether that interpretation was issued 
informally or through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
3. Skidmore Deference Is the Most Appropriate Deference Doctrine 
for Courts Giving Deference to an Agency Interpretation of a 
Common-Law Term 
Because of the potential issues with applying either Chevron or Auer 
deference to agency interpretations of common-law terms, courts would 
benefit from simply giving these interpretations, at most, Skidmore 
deference. Skidmore deference allows for a court to focus its inquiry 
exclusively on whether the agency’s interpretation is aligned with 
common-law precedent. If an agency’s interpretation is persuasive, which 
is to say if an agency’s interpretation of the common-law term aligns with 
traditional judicial meaning, the court should defer to the agency’s 
definition. 
There are several reasons why Skidmore deference makes sense in this 
situation. First, Skidmore deference makes sense because it ensures that 
common-law terms maintain their common-law meaning. Common-law 
terms should not have wildly variable meanings in different contexts. 
Maintaining definitional continuity of common-law terms across a 
spectrum of legal disciplines allows for the predictable application of 
common-law terms across a variety of statutory schemes.242 Second, 
Skidmore deference gives meaning to Congress’s decision to incorporate 
a common-law doctrine into a statute. Skidmore entrusts the court, as the 
gatekeeper and maintainer of the common law, with ensuring that any 
agency interpretation of the common law is in accordance with “the 
language and received traditions” of the common law.243 If agencies wish 
to assign a different meaning to a common-law term within a regulation, 
the agency should simply choose another, non-common-law term. 
Finally, and most importantly, Skidmore deference makes sense 
because agencies do not maintain expertise in the common law—courts 
do. Agencies are policy experts and are “less likely to be concerned about 
careful application of common law.”244 It is the court’s responsibility to 
ensure that the agency interpreted the common law in a way consistent 
with the court’s view of long-established common law. Because agencies 
are “‘prone to policy shifts’ . . . [and] because they are not bound by a 
                                                     
242. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 833 (2010). 
243. Id. at 832 (discussing predictability) (citations omitted). 
244. Id. at 833. 
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strong doctrine of stare decisis, they can often reverse interpretations at 
their own initiative.”245 Agencies may inadvertently introduce ambiguity 
into the common law if left to their own devices. It is the court’s 
responsibility to ensure that an agency’s interpretation of a common-law 
term is concomitant with the well-settled judicial interpretation of that 
same term. If the agency’s interpretation follows the court’s 
interpretation, the court should be sufficiently persuaded to give the 
agency Skidmore deference. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment explores whether the Chevron or Auer deference 
doctrines are appropriate when agencies interpret common-law terms. 
Chevron deference is inappropriate in cases involving disputes over 
agency interpretations of common-law terms because Congress does not 
ordinarily delegate to agencies the power to define terms that it, by 
invoking the common law, has already defined. Chevron only gives 
agencies the power to interpret ambiguous provisions and terms in 
statutes. Common-law terms, though, are not ambiguous. These terms 
have a well-settled meaning that Congress intended to adopt when it used 
the term in a statute. Auer deference is similarly inappropriate in cases 
involving disputes over agency interpretations of common-law terms. 
Common-law terms are terms of art and are not susceptible to change at 
the whim of an individual agency. Agencies cannot unilaterally assign a 
new definition to a common-law term in a regulation and receive 
deference for that definition if it is not aligned with the term’s common-
law meaning. Of the available deference doctrines in administrative law, 
Skidmore deference is most appropriate in cases involving disputes over 
agency interpretations of common-law terms. Skidmore deference allows 
courts, as the final arbiters of the meaning of common-law terms, to 
ensure that agencies do not inappropriately alter the meaning of the 
common law. To receive Skidmore deference for an interpretation of a 
common-law term, an agency would be required to make a persuasive 
argument that its interpretation correctly aligns with the common law. 
Skidmore deference correctly balances power between an agency’s right 
to interpret statutes and regulations and the judiciary’s right to review 
agency decision making. 
 
                                                     
245. Id. at 834. 
